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John Searle’s theory of social ontology posits that there are 
indispensable normative components in the linguistic 
apparatuses termed status functions, collective intentionality, 
and collective recognition, all of which, he argues, make the 
social world. In this paper, I argue that these building blocks 
of Searle’s social ontology are caught in a petitio of 
constitutive circularity. Moreover, I note how Searle fails to 
observe language in reciprocal relation to the institutions 
which not only are shaped by it but also shape language’s 
practical applications. According to Searle, social theorists 
that tried to show a connection between society, culture, and 
language all failed to see the constitutive role of language in 
the making of social reality. Consequently, I believe that 
Searle is himself guilty of a certain kind of blind 
presumption, and argue that Hegel’s philosophy of culture, 
which Searle dismisses as implausible, offers a more 
cohesive account of the normative transactions between 
human beings and their social world. 










                                                 
1 PhD, Email: jlfernandez1@fairfield.edu  
Tel: +1-203-2542156 
a Fairfield University, USA  
 
ARTICLE HISTORY: 
Received December 2019 
Received in revised form February 2020 
Accepted February 2020 











17 J. L. Fernández/ International Journal of Society, Culture & Language, 8(1), 2020             ISSN 2329-2210 
1. Introduction 
n the Preface of Making the Social World, 
John R. Searle (2010) states that he is 
continuing a line of research he began in 
his (1995) earlier work, The Construction of 
Social Reality, though many of the shared 
themes in these two books were also 
developed in (Searle, 2008) Mind, Language, 
and Society, wherein he argued for a mind-
dependent theory of society. In The Construction 
of Social Reality, Searle professed an interest 
in problems of social ontology “having to do 
with how the various parts of the world relate 
to each other” (Searle, 1995, p. xi), and his 
examination of these problems led him to 
argue that because human attitudes are 
constitutive of social reality, and because those 
attitudes have propositional contents with 
logical relations, the institutional facts of 
human societies have a logico-linguistic 
structure (Searle, 1995, pp. 90, 104-112).  
Consequently, Searle continues to stand by his 
belief that “all institutional reality is created by 
linguistic representation” (Searle, 2010, p. 14), 
and he proceeds to examine the fundamental 
preconditions that form the building blocks of 
social reality. As one reads through the text, it 
is evident that Searle embarks on an incredibly 
ambitious project to explicate how social 
reality derives from nothing outside of what he 
calls basic facts, which are akin to the 
foundations “given by physics and chemistry, 
by evolutionary biology and other natural 
sciences. We need to show how all the other 
parts of reality are dependent on, and in 
various ways, derive from, basic facts” 
(Searle, 2010, p. 4). Searle’s (2010) appeal to 
basic facts aims to describe and explain how 
social, institutional structures, 
are based on one principle …. In physics 
it is the atom, in chemistry it is the 
chemical bond, in biology it is the cell, 
in genetics it is the DNA molecule, and 
in geology it is the tectonic plate. I will 
argue that there is similarly an 
underlying principle of social ontology. 
(pp. 6-7)  
If Searle is successful, he will have formulated 
a kind of Social Theory of Everything, a 
unifying formula capable of expressing the 
movement “from electrons to elections and 
from protons to presidents”, as well as the 
ontological stability of other social phenomena 
like “cocktail parties, and income taxes” (pp. 
3-4). 
According to Searle, the underlying principle 
is found in one formal linguistic mechanism; 
more specifically, he argues that the logical 
structure of social reality can be put in the 
following manner: social institutions can be 
said to exist only insofar as they are 
recognized, and that such recognition has to be 
symbolic, i.e., linguistic. As Searle (1995) puts 
it,  
Certain sorts of sounds of marks count 
as words and sentences, and certain sorts 
of utterances count as speech acts. The 
agentive function is that of representing, 
in one or other of the possible speech act 
modes, objects and states of affairs in the 
world. Agents who can do this collectively 
have the fundamental precondition of all 
other institutional structures: Money, 
property, marriage, government, and the 
universities all exist by forms of human 
agreement that essentially involve the 
capacity to symbolize. (p. 228)  
Ultimately, Searle’s (2010) answer to “how 
the various parts of the world relate to each 
other” posits that the human capacity to 
symbolize underlies all of institutional reality, 
and furthermore, this capacity is owed to a 
biological, specifically neurophysiological 
‘Background’. Searle’s (2010) definition of 
Background is often too abstruse, incorporating 
elements of the biological and nonbiological in 
one broad collection of presupposed abilities. 
However, in his earlier works, he offers a 
definition of this Background as “nonintentional 
or preintentional capacities that enable 
intentional states to function …. [these are] 
neurophysiological structures that function 
causally in the production of intentional 
phenomena” (Searle, 1995, p. 129) which are 
held in “human brains and bodies” (Searle, 
1983, p. 154).  
Subsequently, Searle not only continues to 
develop the previous claims he made in The 
Construction of Social Reality, he also makes 
substantial changes to some of his former 
views, e.g., his reversal on an analogy he made 
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namely, that there is a similarity between 
language and games. Searle (2010) now sees 
how this analogy is flawed: “You can’t use the 
analogy with games to explain language 
because you understand games only if you 
already understand language” (Searle, 2010, p. 
115). Later in this paper, implicit in my 
Hegelian reply to Searle’s  (2010) theory of 
social ontology is that you understand games 
and language only if you are already situated 
in culture. 
However, more important for our present 
purposes, Searle (2010) puts forward a new 
argument for his case that “human social 
institutional reality” is created and maintained 
in existence by a unique kind of speech act he 
“baptizes” as Status Function Declarations or 
SF Declarations (pp. 12-13), which depend on 
being collectively recognized. According to 
Searle, SF Declarations make and change the 
social world. Moreover, he argues that while 
social reality is dependent on language, 
language itself is not dependent on social 
reality:  
[L]anguage is different from other social 
institutions, different in such a way as to 
make the existence of all the others 
dependent on language …. All human 
social institutions are brought into 
existence and continue their existence by 
a single logico-linguistic operation that 
can be applied over and over again … 
There is a top-down connection between 
language and institutional facts: you 
cannot have institutional facts without 
language (Searle, 2010, pp. 62-63). 
Correspondingly, Searle’s book also draws 
attention to alleged deficits in the work of 
other philosophers and social theorists who 
seem to take language for granted. He argues 
that such thinkers have all presupposed 
language in their theories without notice to 
how social institutions such as, inter alia, 
money and marriage, depend on language for 
their existence: e.g., thinkers like “Aristotle 
through Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel to 
Habermas, Bourdieu, and Foucault” (Searle, 
2010, p. 62), as well as Idealists like “Kant” 
and “Hegel” (Searle, 1998, pp. 16-18), all 
failed to see the essentially constitutive role of 
language in the making of social reality.  
In this paper, I would like to argue that Searle 
is guilty of a certain kind of blind 
presumption. First, the structural framework of 
his theory of social ontology is constitutively 
circular. Commentators, like Barry Smith 
(2003), have drawn attention to how Searle 
seems to put the cart before the horse or, as 
cleverly sketched by Joseph Margolis (2012a), 
has perhaps fallen prey to “Rousseau’s joke” 
(Margolis, 2012a, pp. 102, 104), suggesting 
the circularity of drawing a social contract: 
i.e., in order for parties to form a social 
contract, they must first contract to form a 
social contract. Both of these appraisals draw 
attention to potentially insuperable 
contradictions in an otherwise rich collection 
of work in social ontology. In a similar spirit, 
but taking a narrower, more circumscribed 
approach, within these pages, I wish to 
perform an immanent critique by focusing on 
the basic building blocks of Searle’s theory to 
show how these constitutive, fundamental 
parts are trapped in an inescapable petitio. 
Searle’s ideas of status functions, collective 
intentionality, and collective recognition are 
all begging the question – they are caught in a 
vicious circle. Second, because Searle is 
offering an account of what he takes to be the 
fundamental underpinnings of extant social 
institutions, the other claim that I want to take 
seriously in this paper is that the formal, i.e., 
logical, constituents of Searle’s (2010) social 
ontology are themselves embedded in cultural 
webs of already existing institutions, practices, 
and traditions which shape language in 
reciprocal relation to the social world. Toward 
this goal, I turn to G. W. F. Hegel’s 
philosophy of culture, which Searle (1995) 
dismisses as implausible, offers a more 
cohesive account of the normative transactions 
between human beings and their social world.  
2. Status Functions 
Searle (2010) argues that the distinctive 
feature of human social reality is that human 
beings have the capacity to impose functions 
on objects and people. He calls this distinctive 
feature “status functions”, which “are the glue 
that holds society together” (p. 9). We can 
think of status functions as representational 
assignments which work by standing in for 
something else, namely, some human institution. 
The efficacy of a status function is proved by 
how well it obtains the purpose of the 
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institution it represents. However, for a status 
function to produce its desired effect, its rule-
bearing deontic powers, or the “rights, duties, 
obligations, authorizations, permissions, 
privileges, authority, and the like” (Searle, 
2010, p. 164), must be collectively recognized:   
The performance of a function requires 
that there be a collectively recognized 
status that the person or object has, and 
it is only in virtue of that status that the 
person or object can perform the 
function in question …. [A]ll people or 
objects [are] able to perform certain 
functions in virtue of the fact that they 
have a collectively recognized status that 
enables them to perform those functions 
in a way they could not do without 
collective recognition of the status. (p. 7) 
Status Functions are, therefore, institutional 
facts (like money, presidents, etc.), which are 
dependent on collective recognition for their 
deontic powers: 
It is only in virtue of collective 
recognition that this piece of paper is a 
twenty-dollar bill, that Barack Obama is 
president of the United States, that I am 
a citizen of the United States, that the 
Giants beat the Dodgers three to two in 
eleven innings, and that the car in the 
driveway is my property. (p. 8) 
Searle’s (2010) discussion of the distinctive 
feature of status functions is taken up in his 
introduction of “a fascinating class of speech 
acts” called “Declarations”: 
The main theoretical innovation of this 
book, and one, though not the only, 
reason for my writing it is that I want to 
introduce a very strong theoretical claim. 
All institutional facts, and therefore all 
status functions, are created by speech 
acts of a type that in 1975 I baptized as 
“Declarations”. (p. 11) 
Declarations are performative utterances that 
instantiate social reality by linguistic fiat. They 
are forms of illocutionary speech acts that 
shape and change the world in the following 
manner: a declaration is made that something 
is the case, and thus, something is the case. 
Searle’s (2010) ‘fascination’ with Declarations 
leads him to make a very ambitious 
pronouncement for what he calls Status 
Function Declarations (SF Declarations): “The 
claim that I will be expounding and defending 
in this book is that all of human institutional 
reality is created and maintained in existence 
by…SF Declarations” (p. 13). This is a major 
claim because SF Declarations “create an 
institutional reality of status functions by 
representing them as existing” (p, 13). 
However, just as we noted with status 
functions, Searle (2010) argues the creation of 
institutional facts by SF Declarations is 
achieved by representational assignments 
which also depend on being collectively 
recognized, namely, by the collective 
recognition of constitutive rules, 
The most general form of the creation of an 
institutional fact is that we (or I) make it the 
case by Declaration that the status function Y 
exists. Constitutive rules of the form ‘X counts 
as Y in C’ are what we might think of as 
standing Declarations. (p. 13)  
Let us summarize the findings of section 2 
above as Searlean Supposition 1: Both status 
functions and SF Declarations are dependent 
on collective recognition for their world-
making deontic powers.  
3. Collective Intentionality 
My examination of Searle’s explication of 
status functions and SF Declarations has 
shown that both are dependent on collective 
recognition if they are to succeed in creating 
and maintaining all human institutional reality. 
The importance of collective recognition is 
developed by Searle (2010) in his discussion 
of collective intentionality in planning and 
acting (i.e., social cooperation). For example, 
Searle (2010) believes that collective 
intentionality is “the fundamental building 
blocks of all social ontology and human 
society in general [and] the most important 
form of collective intentionality is collective 
intentions in planning and acting” (p. 43). 
Although Searle (2010) seems to conflate the 
two sorts of collectives in an ambiguous 
disjunction, e.g., “I can say that for status 
functions to work, there must be collective 
acceptance or recognition … The point is that 
status functions can only work to the extent 
 
 
20 Circularity in Searle’s Social Ontology: With a Hegelian Reply 
that they are collectively recognized …. Status 
functions depend on collective intentionality” 
(p. 8), the distinct division of world-making 
labor seems to be that status functions depend 
on collective intentionality, which itself 
depends on being collectively recognized for 
status functions to succeed.  
Collective intentions in planning and acting 
involve not only cooperative behavior, but, 
more importantly, also set the norms and 
standards to which cooperative participants are 
subject. Searle (2010) posits two hypothetical 
scenarios to convey his idea of collective 
intentions in planning and acting. In (1), he 
imagines a group of Harvard Business School 
graduates, who, sold on Adam Smith’s theory 
of the invisible hand, embark on a post-
graduation goal to better the world by being as 
selfish as they possibly can to become as rich 
as they can. In this scenario, each graduate has 
the same individual goal, and each knows that 
all others have the same goal and know of its 
shared nature. In (2), the same case is 
mirrored, except that the graduate students 
make a pact to carry the Smithian banner in 
pursuit of humanity’s betterment. Searle 
(2010) argues that only (2) is a case of collective 
intentionality in virtue of an obligation 
assumed by each individual member, while the 
first case presented no such obligation.  
The difference between the two cases may be 
put in the following way. Because there was 
no obligation in the first case, there was no 
deontic power underlying the graduates’ actions. 
For Searle (2010), collective intentionality is 
not merely the sum of individual behavior 
toward the fulfillment of a goal, 
Just having the same goal, even having 
the same goal in the knowledge that they 
know that I share the same goal with 
them, is not by itself enough for 
cooperation in my sense. When I talk 
about this form of collective intentionality, 
I am talking about the capacity of 
humans and other animals to actually 
cooperate in their activities. Cooperation 
implies the existence of common 
knowledge or belief, but the common 
knowledge or belief, together with 
individual intentions to achieve a 
common goal is not by itself sufficient 
for cooperation. (p. 49)   
Thus collective intentionality “cannot in 
general be reduced to individual intentionality 
plus mutual belief” (p. 57). Genuine collective 
intentionality is instead dependent on 
collective recognition of certain norms and 
standards to which the cooperative participants 
are subject. Searle (2010) argues that such 
norms are the deontic rules by which 
institutions function,  
As a general point, institutional 
structures require collective recognition 
by the participants in the institution in 
order to function …. [Moreover,] I want 
to emphasize that in order for cooperation 
to take place within an institutional 
structure, there has to be a general 
collective recognition or acceptance of 
the institution that does not necessarily 
involve active participation. (p. 57) 
Consequently, status functions depend on 
collective intentionality and collective 
intentionality is dependent on collective 
recognition. Let us summarize the findings of 
section 3 as Searlean Supposition 2: As we 
noted with SF Declarations, collective 
intentionality is also dependent on collective 
recognition for institutional structures to 
function. 
Collective recognition is, therefore, a sine qua 
non condition for the possibility of making the 
social world, lest the shared work so necessary 
for world-making is lost. Consequently, we 
might, along with Searle (2010), ask: “Of what 
does collective recognition, which makes 
possible collective intentionality, consist?” (p. 
58).  
4. Collective Recognition 
We have seen how Searle believes that status 
functions, SF Declarations, and collective 
intentionality work only insofar as they are 
collectively recognized. Accordingly, because 
collective recognition is central for Searle’s 
ideas of Status Functions, SF Declarations, 
and Collective Intentionality, all of which play 
distinctive and crucial roles in the making of 
social reality, we must understand collective 
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Searle (2010) offers an answer by explaining 
that general collective recognition or 
acceptance of institutional structures need not 
entail approval of any particular institutional 
structure. He points to the case of members of 
the “Nazi party” (p. 57) that might not have 
approved or endorsed the institutional 
structure of Germany while governed under 
Adolf Hitler, but which nonetheless accepted 
the institutional structures, rules, and norms of 
the Third Reich. Hence when it comes to 
collective recognition, acceptance need not be 
conflated with approval.  
Consequently, we can understand collective 
recognition or acceptance involving persons 
collectively coming to hold, and holding, a 
relevant social attitude which is recognized in 
the mode of ‘we’ instead of ‘I’. The 
acceptance of institutional structures entails 
that social institutions are taken to be norm-
governed social practices, whether one 
approves of those practices or not. Disapproval 
of an institutional structure, for example, does 
not mean that the institutional structure is not 
recognized, but the contrary. 
Searle employs his Harvard Business School 
case and the validity of money to illustrate the 
notion of general acceptance. He argues that 
collective recognition consists in the 
requirement “that each participant [in the 
Harvard Business School case] accepts the 
existence and validity of money [i.e., a status 
function] in the belief that there is mutual 
acceptance on the part of the others” (Searle, 
2010, p. 58). In other words, in answer to the 
question, “Of what does collective recognition 
consist?” (Searle, 2010, p. 59) it appears 
collective recognition is constituted by the fact 
that persons recognize a status function (e.g., 
money) and, concomitantly, that there is 
mutual knowledge among the persons that 
they all recognize that status function.  
Collective recognition is, therefore, nothing 
other than the general acceptance on the part 
of human beings to such things as status 
functions, SF Declarations, and collective 
intentionality. Let us summarize the findings 
of section 4 as Searlean Supposition 3: 
Collective recognition depends on the 
existence of status functions, SF Declarations, 
and collective intentionality. 
That collective recognition, upon which status 
functions, SF Declarations, and that enable 
collective intentionality, turns out to be 
dependent on these already existing formal 
constituents of Searle’s theory is, of course, 
stepping into the mire of petitio principii. 
Recall that Searle described SF Declarations 
as a kind of status function that carries deontic 
powers which depend on being collectively 
recognized. In other words, a status function is 
not accorded its function and deontic powers 
unless it is collectively recognized. In 
addition, collective intentionality, which 
allows for shared membership in world-
making cooperation, also depends on 
collective recognition. However, if collective 
recognition or acceptance can only occur in 
the presence of an already existing status 
function, this would seem to suggest that there 
is a deontic power already attached to the 
status function before its recognition as such.  
I want to restate the following relational 
structure. Status functions (A) are dependent 
on collective intentionality (B), which itself is 
dependent on collective recognition (C); 
however, Searle writes that collective 
recognition (C) can only take place before an 
already established status function (A). I want 
to illustrate this circularity by sketching out 
another of Searle’s (2008) examples, namely, 
in the following ‘parable’, 
Suppose a community builds a wall 
around its dwellings. The wall now has a 
collectively assigned function, which 
function it can perform in virtue of its 
structure. But suppose the wall gradually 
decays until the only thing that is left is a 
line of stones. But suppose that the 
people continue to recognize the line of 
stones as a boundary, they continue to 
accept that they are not supposed to cross. 
The line now performs the function that 
the wall once performed, but it performs 
the function not in virtue of its physical 
structure but in virtue of the collective 
acceptance that the line of stones now 
has a certain status and with that status a 
function which can only be performed in 
virtue of the collective acceptance of that 
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In the above example, the material wall was 
built as a boundary not to be crossed. The 
wall’s function is not symbolic but concrete, it 
is literally obstructing and fulfills its purpose 
by virtue of its impassibility. However, after 
the material wall decays over time and 
concretely disappears, its remnant line of 
rubble holds the same deontic powers in the 
community due to its members’ capacity 
toward collective intentionality and, thus, the 
leftover line of rocks bears the same purpose 
as the previous wall because of collective 
recognition of its symbolic status function. 
After examining Searle’s (2008) ‘parable’, we 
can state that the status function (i.e., the SF 
Declaration, do not transgress this boundary) 
is dependent on the community’s members 
collective intentionality (all obey its deontic 
command, even though the wall is now rubble) 
by virtue of same community’s recognition or 
acceptance of the duty not to transgress this 
boundary, hence the recognition of its 
symbolic function (i.e., the SF Declaration). 
Presumably, a group of individuals who are 
not members of this community would not 
obey this duty because, well, being outside this 
culture, they do not recognize any such vestige 
prohibition. In order for these alien individuals 
to recognize the symbolic function in their 
encounter with a line of rocks, they would 
have to be told something like the parable 
above from members of the community, i.e., 
that there used to be a wall to keep us from 
going past this point, it is no longer here, but 
we all adhere to its old purpose anyway. Now 
that those outside the cultural loop have been 
instructed to recognize the deontic power of 
the rocks’ symbolic status function, they might 
say, OK, we’ll also do like you do. And so the 
alien group joins the community through 
collective intentionality because they have 
been instructed to recognize the deontic power 
of the symbolic status function. What this 
seems to imply is that status functions (A) are 
only followed through collective intentionality 
(B) by being collectively recognized (C) as 
status functions (A). And this is indeed circular.  
5. Where is Culture in Searle’s Social 
Ontology?  
What is also striking about Searle’s account of 
social ontology is his omission of any 
discussion of the role that culture (Bildung) 
might play in the making of the social world. 
Although his characterization of collective 
recognition seems to bear the imprint of 
culture, there is no discussion of cultural forms 
such as art, religion, customs, and traditions, 
or of how such forms might help to shape our 
understanding of institutional facts and 
structures. This appears to be a concerted 
move on Searle’s part, who, as we have seen, 
faults theorists (like Kant and Hegel) who take 
culture seriously in their social and political 
theories for failing to note the socially 
constitutive role of language. Perhaps we 
should not be surprised by this, given our 
understanding of Searle’s bio-, the neuro-
centric theory of language. And yet this seems 
a strange oversight because Searle (2002) has 
already hinted at the constitutive role of 
culture in his critique of Noam Chomsky’s 
innatist theory of language, 
[I]n order to understand, for example, 
the word ‘bureaucrat’, a child has to be 
introduced to a culture, a culture that 
includes governments, bureaus, 
departments, powers, employment, and a 
host of other things. A child does not 
learn a set of discrete concepts, but 
learns to master a culture, and once that 
culture is mastered, it is not difficult for 
him to understand the word ‘bureaucrat’. 
(p. 35) 
Substitute the word ‘bureaucrat’ with ‘status 
functions’ and you can begin to form concerns 
with Searle’s own indifference to culture in his 
theory of social ontology. Indeed, it is without 
the slightest hesitation that he has rejected 
theories with strong cultural emphases from 
his work of how language makes the social 
world. For example, Searle (1995) dismisses 
out of hand the idea that Hegel’s conception of 
Geist  or “Spirit” (p. 25) can add any meaningful 
relevance to collective intentionality. 
However, Hegel has important things to say 
about the normative formation of collective 
intentionality and institutional structures. This 
is a recognized and long-standing research 
agenda for thinkers studying the intersection 
between language and culture, and can be 
summarized in Robert Brandom’s (2019) 
recent remark that,  
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For [Hegel’s philosophy] invites us to 
think of the norms that transform us into 
discursive beings by governing our 
activities—Bildung, the culture that is 
our second nature, Hegelian Geist—as 
instituted by those very activities. Such 
an approach presents us as self-
constituting beings: creatures of norms 
we ourselves create. (p. 12)  
Recall that norms constitute the deontic power 
of Searle’s status function. Now consider an 
institution that requires reciprocal recognition 
of contractual obligation (Searle uses money 
as an example of this over and again). 
Whatever Searle might think of the Hegelian 
world spirit, in Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit (1977) and the Philosophy of Right 
(1967), the constitutive element of social 
reality (soziale Wirklichkeit) are outlined by 
arguing that for an agent to realize her own 
ends, she must recognize her fellow human 
beings as partners who are normatively able to 
abide by their contractual obligations. One of 
the best expressions of this recognition is 
clearly and succinctly put forward by Frank B. 
Farrell’s (1994) phrase, “self-relating-in-
relating-to-otherness” (1994, p. 24; 2019, pp. 
42-43), which conveys the notion that human 
normative transactions require finding oneself 
in a relationship to otherness, thereby taking 
part in the unity of a social whole.  
This mutual recognition is not attained through 
appeal to a neurophysiological Background of 
basic facts, however necessary to symbolic 
representation, but rather through the indelible 
stamp of culture. Culture is formed by Spirit to 
transform social reality according to its needs, 
and language is one such construct. Contra 
Searle, it might be claimed with Joseph 
Margolis’ (2012b) “Darwinized-Hegelian” 
reading of the reciprocal relation between 
language and culture, 
External Bildung accounts for the 
originary appearance of true language as 
the emergent outcome of a continuous 
series of progressive transformations of 
the forms of prelinguistic hominid 
communicative powers through the 
processes of cultural evolution …. 
Language and what language uniquely 
makes possible in the way of the 
evolving powers of the human mind are 
emergent, artifactual, hybrid precipitates 
of the joint process of biological and 
cultural evolution. (pp. 131, 133)  
Here Margolis draws attention, rightly I 
believe, to how external cultural conditions, 
i.e., external Bildung, make possible the 
emergence of internal subjective states. The 
Darwinian aspect is captured in how 
arbitrariness and contingency allow for a rich 
emergence of cultural artifacts, which includes 
the formation of human beings in their 
practices; the Hegelian aspect is seen in how 
Hegel’s notion of objective spirit (political 
institutions, art, religion) is shaped by the 
subjective spirit (feelings of selfhood), which, 
in its ongoing process of historical 
development, changes the world according to 
its own self-understanding. Culture is the 
expression of spirit, as it both shapes and is 
shaped. For Hegel, the distinction between 
“outer” (object) and ‘inner” (subject) is 
dissolved, which is why ethical life or 
Sittlichkeit, i.e., extant social practices and 
arrangements, is so necessary to the formation 
of Spirit (Geist).   
An example of external Bildung is sketched 
out in Hegel’s (1967) Philosophy of Right, 
specifically with regard to market transactions. 
The transformation of natural needs into 
interests capable of being executed in 
exchanges requires the articulation of one’s 
own specific wishes in a language that is 
universal enough to permit one to use it to 
declare an interest that the other will 
comprehend. Hegel (1967, p. 240) argues that 
this language already includes the social 
concept of monetary value and the deferral of 
satisfaction until after the close of the 
transaction. Hegel (1967) makes clear that, 
with some modification to Searle’s idiom, the 
collective recognition of a status function 
requires participation in already established 
practices. The market exchange of money 
(Geld) is one such practice, and that fluency, 
namely, to collectively recognize money as a 
thing with a status function, requires culture. 
Money only has value, and therefore can only 
perform its function, in an already spun 
cultural web of relations which serve as 
background norms. 
One might question what values go into one’s 
choosing to approve or disapprove an 
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institutional structure. Indeed, Searle (2010) 
asks at one point, “But where do values come 
from?” (p. 59). His answer points to the 
assignment of purposive functions for 
evaluative appraisals by human beings. For 
example, Searle (2010) argues that, “The clue 
that there is a normative component to the 
notion of function is that once we have 
described something in terms of function we 
can introduce a normative vocabulary” (p. 59). 
But if this is so, then the appraising human 
beings who are the users of a normative 
vocabulary are also already encultured, like 
the Harvard Business School students of a 
Harvard Business School culture who 
collectively raised the Smithian banner to, in 
their minds, help the world. Hegel’s serious 
consideration of culture in the making of 
social reality shows that we not only create 
social institutions but also that these 
institutions work to form us as social selves.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
If I have been careful in my explication of 
Searle’s idea of the world-making capacities 
of status functions, SF Declarations, and 
collective intentionality; and if I am right that 
status functions and SF Declarations and 
collective intentionality are dependent on 
collective recognition for their world making 
deontic powers; and if I am right that 
collective recognition is accepting of already 
established status functions, SF Declarations, 
and collective intentionality, I believe to have 
offered a plausible conclusion that the relation, 
and formulation, of these basic constituents of 
Searlean social ontology are trapped in a 
circular web.  
Moreover, with regard to Searle’s (1995) 
doubt that Hegel’s philosophy has anything 
relevant to contribute in our understanding of 
language and society, Hegel’s (1967, 1977) 
serious consideration of culture shows that we 
not only create our laws and institutions but 
that these laws and institutions also create us. 
Culture thus forms a crucial part of who we 
are both as individuals and as members of a 
society. And this poietic activity is not circular 
but rather is a process of back and forth 
transactional transformation. It is not just that 
we make our cultural and social institutions; 
they make us.  
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